



Secretary of Defence  
Ministry  
of  
Defence

Page 1 of 14

## OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES

Defence House, Wellington, New Zealand



Chief of Defence Force  
New Zealand  
Defence  
Force

6 June 2003

Prime Minister  
Deputy Prime Minister  
Hon Jim Anderton  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
Minister of Defence

### IRAQ AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: OPTIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND CONTRIBUTIONS

Proposal

Out of scope

In respect of Operation Enduring Freedom, Ministers with Power to Act  
are invited to:

- note the approximate cost of each deployment at Annex A;

- note that the UK has accepted the offer of two NZDF Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to provide command and leadership training to the Afghan National Army (ANA), and that officials are exploring a contribution to specialist light infantry training and other training support options; and authorise in principle the deployment of two NZDF NCOs to provide command and leadership training to the ANA from September 2003 to June 2004;
- note the capability of the NZDF to deploy up to 100 personnel to Afghanistan to lead or contribute to an established Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for a period of 12 months from mid-August 2003, \_\_\_\_\_ and the findings of a New Zealand reconnaissance mission; authorise officials to continue to pursue the option of leading or contributing to an established PRT, preferably Bamian, \_\_\_\_\_ and authorise the deployment of a reconnaissance team to Afghanistan, together with the costs incurred, to explore this and other ANA training support options, including the provision of specialist light infantry training; and
- \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ note the options on fleet composition for possible RNZN re-deployments to OEF MIO operations, and the associated approximate operating costs; and note that some of the deployment options included in this submission may, if approved or extended, constrain the NZDF's ability to deploy certain force elements for any contingencies that may arise in the region.

6(a)  
6(b)(i)  
6(a)  
6(b)(i)  
9(2)(g)(i)

6(a)  
9(2)(g)(i)  
6(b)(i)  
6(a)  
9(2)(g)(i)

## Background

3. Under CAB Min (03) 34/17 and CAB Min (03) 10/17, Cabinet authorised a group of Ministers, comprising the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon Jim Anderton, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister of Defence, to have Power to Act in respect of deployments to Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom. This submission is made under that arrangement.

4. On 26 May 2003, Ministers with Power to Act considered papers setting out possible options for further contributions to humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom. Ministers welcomed the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1483, and made a number of decisions on New Zealand deployments to both Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom, subject to more detailed consideration of the costs and the sustainability of each deployment.

6(a)

9(2)(g)(i)  
6(b)(i)

Officials were also asked to provide more detail on selected options for Ministers' consideration.

5. Set out below is a list of possible deployments to Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom, on which Ministers have requested further information. The cost of each deployment is provisional and may vary in accordance with such factors as the timing of the contribution, its overall size and its duration. We comment on the basis of the most current information. A final determination of the costs, logistics and sustainment issues is contingent upon the deployment of reconnaissance teams to the UK, Iraq and Afghanistan. Sustainment includes both initial deployment and through mission support, and may require the charter of civilian ships and aircraft.

**New Zealand Contributions to Iraq**

Out  
of  
scope

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

Out of  
Scope

## New Zealand Contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom

### Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

14. USCENTCOM has established three PRTs in locations throughout Afghanistan. This month the British will establish a fourth, with a further four to be established by September 2003. PRTs consist of relatively small teams (ranging between 50-100 personnel, depending on location and individual country approaches) tasked with assisting the transitional government extend its influence beyond Kabul. Their focus is on enhancing the security environment and promoting the reconstruction effort, while monitoring and assessing military, civil and political reform efforts through community engagement.

15. The NZDF can sustain a deployment of up to 100 personnel to lead or contribute to an existing PRT for 12 months from mid-August 2003. This is on our offer to lead an established PRT, preferably Bamian, and the findings of a New Zealand reconnaissance mission. The NZDF has planned, and can sustain, a short term deployment of up to 10 NZ SAS personnel for an initial period of eight weeks. This element will provide additional force protection for the New Zealand PRT as it establishes itself and becomes familiar with local conditions.

6(a)

6(a)

16. Planning for this deployment is set against the following assumptions, which a reconnaissance team will confirm with the US:

- a. USCENTCOM will support the offer by New Zealand to lead or contribute to an established PRT, preferably Bamian.
- b. USCENTCOM will provide logistic sustainment in theatre for all non-New Zealand specific support requirements, including aero-medical evacuation and tactical transport.
- c. US forces will hand-over the existing facilities in Bamian intact, less equipment.
- d. US forces will provide an engineer capability to Bamian to develop the infrastructure required to accommodate the New Zealand contribution.

17. Given the significant costs involved, if New Zealand is to assume the leadership of an established PRT, it is preferable that it be one that is close to Kabul (i.e. Bamian). This would remove the considerable burden of the set up costs,

9(2)(g)(i)  
6(a)

In the event that New Zealand is unable to lead the Bamian PRT, officials will explore alternative options

6(a)  
9(2)(g)(i)

18. With respect to security, an Infantry Platoon will deploy as part of the New Zealand PRT, and provide ongoing force protection for low-level contingencies

6(a)



Close air support will also be available to the New Zealand PRT. All NZDF personnel in Afghanistan will be armed.

6(a)

19. The total approximate operating cost of this deployment is \$NZ 25 – 27 million (plus up to \$NZ 2 million capital cost), inclusive of Defence Force allowances (payable to the Ministry of Social Development) and NZDF operating expenses. In addition, there may be an expectation that New Zealand would provide funding for reconstruction efforts as part of the PRT leadership.

#### Afghan National Army (ANA)

20. The offer to the British of two NCOs to provide command and leadership training to the ANA has been accepted by the UK. The timeframe for the deployment is from September 2003 to June 2004, during which time the New Zealand NCOs will be fully integrated with the UK training team. Under no circumstances would NZDF personnel accompany ANA forces on operations.

21. Ministers also directed officials to further consider, and report on, the possibility of providing other training deployments to the ANA. Of the training deployments considered in the paper dated 22 May 2003, the option of contributing an engineer training team is no longer viable, given anticipated commitments in Iraq. Officials continue, however, to explore the provision of specialist light infantry training. Preliminary discussions suggest that this would involve the delivery of a range of courses to select ANA personnel, including unit trackers, dismounted reconnaissance patrol commanders and rifle section commanders. Further exploration of this and other options is contingent on the reconnaissance visit.

22. The total approximate operating cost of deploying two NCOs to work with the UK training team is \$NZ 0.2 – 0.3 million, inclusive of Defence Force allowances (payable to the Ministry of Social Development) and NZDF operating expenses. The total approximate cost of a specialist light infantry training team is \$1.8 – 2 million.

#### Continued RNZN Participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

out of  
scope

out of  
scope

### Financial Implications for all Contributions

26. Detailed costs for each deployment option will vary depending on the final timings chosen, planned NZDF activities that will be amended, the amount of in-theatre support available from other forces and the possible requirement to establish a regionally based National Command Element (NCE) to achieve centralised national operational oversight. At this stage, the total approximate cost including the Defence Force allowances (payable to the Ministry of Social Development) and NZDF operating expenses for each option has been derived from the best available information. Full and detailed costs, including the breakdown across financial years, will be provided as part of any paper seeking formal approval to proceed with a deployment and the consequential appropriation required.

27. Some options involve the deployment of a reconnaissance team to confirm a range of issues, including sources of accommodation, rations, and local support. An MFAT officer will accompany the reconnaissance team to Afghanistan and will report on possible requirements for diplomatic support. Costs involved in such reconnaissance will be included in requests for additional appropriations. To ensure that there is no delay in mounting an operation, approval is sought from Ministers with Power to Act to incur these reconnaissance costs prior to final approval.

### Threat Assessment

Iraq

out of  
scope

Afghanistan

31. Security remains a prime concern throughout Afghanistan. Although al Qaeda and Taliban forces were routed, pockets of resistance remain in many parts of the country. There is evidence that both groups have now combined with other anti-coalition elements in an effort to destabilise the transitional government and regain power.

32. The threat level in Kabul is reduced slightly by the military presence of ISAF. The threat level for NZDF personnel in Kabul is **MEDIUM**.

33. Outside of Kabul anti-government elements continue a sustained guerrilla campaign. There is also lawlessness and civil unrest in many areas.

The threat level for NZDF personnel operating outside of Kabul is **HIGH**.

34. The overall threat level to NZDF in Afghanistan is assessed as **HIGH**. These threat levels will also be regularly monitored.

The Gulf

Legal Implications

Iraq

out of  
scope

9(2)(g)(i)

out of  
scope

out of  
scope



37.

DOS

#### Operation Enduring Freedom

38. The proposed contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom are justified under UN Security Council Resolution 1368. This explicitly recognised the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This was reinforced by subsequent UN Security Council resolutions, including 1373 and 1378.

39. Operation Enduring Freedom continues to be regarded by participating countries as an international armed conflict under international law. Accordingly, reliance is placed on customary international law in relation to issues of jurisdiction and compensation. The international laws applicable in international armed conflicts would apply to all NZDF force elements deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Notable amongst these laws are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977.

#### **Command and Control**

40. The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) will retain full command of all NZDF personnel deployed to Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom.

41. To enable CDF to maintain full visibility of NZDF operations, all deployed New Zealand personnel are placed under the operational command of the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ). COMJFNZ will appoint a Senior National Officer (SNO) to perform a similar function for each deployment so that national operational oversight may be centralised, where appropriate, with the establishment of a deployed NCE. Deployed personnel will only be employed in those locations and on those specific tasks and duties that have been agreed between CDF and the UK and USCENTCOM in respect of Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom. The employment of NZDF personnel on tasks and duties other than those agreed would require prior consultation and New Zealand national approval. Any tasks or locations considered inappropriate, beyond the scope agreed to by the government, or that may cause undue risk to NZDF personnel and assets, will be vetoed by the SNO, on behalf of CDF.

#### **Publicity**

9(2X g(i)

Representation in Baghdad

005

Consultation

44. This submission reflects the views of the NZDF, the Ministry of Defence and MFAT. Treasury and NZAID have been consulted

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

## Recommendations

45. It is recommended that Ministers with Power to Act:

- d. note that the UK has accepted the offer of two NZDF NCOs to provide command and leadership training to the ANA, and that officials are exploring a contribution to specialist light infantry training and other training support options.
- e. authorise in principle the deployment of two NZDF NCOs to provide command and leadership training to the ANA from September 2003 to June 2004, with an appropriation of the approximate cost of \$NZ 0.2 – 0.3 to be sought at a later date.
- f. note the capability of the NZDF to deploy up to 100 personnel to Afghanistan to lead or contribute to a PRT for a period of 12 months from mid-August 2003.
- g. authorise officials to continue to pursue the option of leading or contributing to the Bamian or another established PRT  
and for the deployment of a reconnaissance team to Afghanistan to explore this and ANA training support options, including the provision of specialist light infantry training, with associated costs to be incurred against existing appropriations within Vote Defence Force and Vote MSD.

out of  
scope

6(a)

9(2)(g)(i)

out of  
scope

out of  
Scope

6(a)  
6(b)(i)  
9(2)(g)(i)

005

005

n. note that some of the deployment options included in this submission may, if approved or extended, constrain the NZDF's ability to deploy certain force elements for any contingencies that may arise in the region.

6(a)  
9(2)(g)(i)

Graham Fortune  
Secretary of Defence

*for  
Absent  
of duty*  
B.R. Ferguson  
Air Marshal  
Chief of Defence Force

Michael Green  
for Secretary of Foreign  
Affairs and Trade

Rt Hon Helen Clark  
Prime Minister  
Approved / Declined

Hon Dr Michael Cullen  
Deputy Prime Minister  
Approve / Declined

Hon Jim Anderton  
Approve / Declined

Hon Phil Goff  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
Approve / Declined

Hon Mark Burton  
Minister of Defence  
Approve / Declined

## Approximate Costs for Operational Deployments

	Operating Costs (Defence Force Allowances plus NZDF Operating Expenses) \$million (GST incl)	Capital Costs \$million (GST n/a)
.....		
Provincial Reconstruction Team	25 - 27	2
Training ANA - 2 NCOs - light infantry team	0.2 - 0.3 1.8 - 2.0	Unknown

out of  
scopeout of  
scopeout of  
scope

Released under the Official Information Act 1982



Annex B

Talking Points for Public Announcement

Ministers have today taken decisions on further NZ contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and on support for the reconstruction of Iraq.

OEF - Afghanistan

- Deployment of an NZDF reconnaissance mission to investigate the options for a NZ contribution to a Provincial Reconstruction Team. The purpose of the PRTs is to extend the Afghan Transitional Authority's capacity beyond Kabul by improving the security environment in the regions and stimulating security sector reform and reconstruction. The mission is already in the field and will report back within two weeks.
- Deployment of two NZDF officers to work with a UK team providing command and leadership training to the Afghan National Army in Kabul for 12 months from September 2003. The establishment of a multi-ethnic ANA remains key to the promotion of security in Afghanistan.

OEF – Maritime Interdiction Operations

Iraq

Out of  
scope

Out of  
scope

Released under the Official Information Act 1982