

OFFICE OF THE **CHIEF EXECUTIVES**

Defence House, Wellington, New Zealand



22 May 2003

Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister Hon Jim Anderton Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister of Defence

AFGHANISTAN: OPTIONS FOR NEW WALAND DEFENCE FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Proposal

That Ministers with Powers to Act note and provide direction in respect of military options for New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. A Colorado IIII de la colorado de la

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- 3. At present New Zealand has several major force elements deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. An RNZN frigate is currently in the Gulf as part of Operation Enduring Freedom Maritime Interdiction Operations until 30 June 2003. An RNZAF P-3K Orion aircraft joined the operation earlier this month and will provide maritime surveillance support for up to six months. In addition, an RNZAF C-130 Hercules aircraft is to undertake tactical air transport duties in and around Afghanistan for three months from late June 2003.
- 4. New Zealand also has eight staff officers deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Five are attached to USCENTCOM in Florida, and three to the Headquarters Coalition Joint Task Force in Afghanistan (CJTF-180). In addition, four staff officers are attached to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.
- 5. Set out below is a list of options available to the government for deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The indicative cost of each option is approximate and may vary in accordance with such factors as the timing of the deployment, its overall size and its duration. Each option is based on current information, and is set against the following considerations:
- a. This submission considers the question of what the NZDF could do in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It does not consider the military options available to the government in respect of Operation Enduring Freedom beyond the Afghanistan theatre.
- b. None of the options listed below would preclude an NZDF contribution to future post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq, assuming suitable multilateral cover emerges from the Security Council. Once the Security Council resolution is adopted officials will seek further guidance from Ministers on this and other possible outstanding options in relation to Irac.
- c. Nor would they impact on the NZDF's ability to sustain current commitments to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the Gulf.

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Option One: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

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6. As the campaign against al Qaeda and the Taleban in Afghanistan shifts from a purely military approach to one that stresses the importance of state building and the repair of critical infrastructure, USCENTCOM is tasked

with establishing up to eight PRTs in locations throughout Afghanistan. The PRTs are seen as a vital part of the programme for extending the authority of the transitional government beyond Kabul. They will focus on enhancing the security environment and promoting the reconstruction effort, while monitoring and assessing military, civil and political reform efforts through community engagement.

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the estimated establishment costs of a PRT are in the region of \$NZD 5-6 million. The provision of between 50 and 100 NZDF personnel to run the PRT or a period of 12 months would cost in the region of \$NZD 4 million. These figures are indicative and would vary considerably given the location of the PRT both in terms of terrain and proximity to Kabul.

6 (b)(i)

8. Given the significant costs involved, and subject to this option being selected, it might be preferable for New Zealand to offer to take over, staff and run an established site, preferably close to Kabul. The NZDF could sustain such a deployment for up to 12 months

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The United States has already established PRTs at Bamyan, Gardez and Konduz (see Annex 2). The United Kingdom is scheduled to deploy a joint civil-military team comprising military, diplomatic and aid personnel, to establish a PRT in Mezar-e-Sharif in June 2003. Any further consideration of this option would be dependent on consultation with the relevant parties and require detailed reconnaissance on the ground in Afghanistan and United States both the strategic and operational levels.

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also make a very positive contribution to nation building in Afghanistan.

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Option two. New Zealand Special Air Services (NZ SAS)

10. The requirement for Special Forces troops within the coalition remains expent with the focus of operations now in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border egions.

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The NZ SAS would be able to deploy a contingent, similar in size and capabilities to the earlier contribution in 2002. The estimated cost of contributing contingent for six months is \$NZD 4 million.

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Option Three: Afghan National Army (ANA)

14. A key determinant of future coalition force levels in Afghanistan will be the progress in establishing the ANA. The US is taking the lead in training the ANA, and has backed plans for a multi-ethnic Army of 70,000 supported by an Air Force of 8,000 (both under the Afghan Ministry of Defence) and a 12,000 strong border guard (under the Afghan Interior Ministry).

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16. Continuation training builds on collective skills learnt in basic training. It includes training in tactics, techniques and procedures, and incorporates the use of standard infantry support weapons (i.e. mortars and light anti-armour weapons). The options for an NZDF training team to provide continuation training for the ANA are as follows:

- a. An engineer training team of approximately nine personnel to train ANA commanders in engineer planning and the employment of engineer assets.
- b. A Light infantry specialist training team of no fixed establishment to conduct specialist infantry courses.
- c. Provide the United Kingdom training team with two Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) to provide command and leadership training to ANA senior and junior NCO's from September 2003 to June 2004.

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The approximate indicative cost of deploying up to nine NZDF personnel to train the ANA for one year is \$NZD 1 million.

Comment

18. The security situation in Afghanistan remains fracile

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transitional government is in place and will remain until a new constitution is approved and a fully representative government installed following elections scheduled for June 2004. But recalcitrant warlords are still to be demobilised, while pockets of al Qaeda and Taleban forces remain active. In the absence of a functioning security apparatus under central government control, the transitional government will continue to rely heavily on coalition forces as it attempts to extend its authority beyond Kabul, of which the deployment of PRTs is a central component.

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The group of countries involved in the campaign against terrorism, which includes most of our security partners, would welcome this contribution.

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There are, however, significant risks which will need to be taken into account when weighing this response against other alternatives (refer paragraphs 21-23).

Command and Control

20. The deployment of major land contingents to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom would require the establishment of an in-theatre New Zealand national command element (NCE). This would allow national command responsibilities to be simplified and exercised over any major NZDF deployment to Afghanistan and the several minor deployments already on the ground (for example the staff officer contributions to ISAF and CJTF-180). To date, each deployment has had its own senior national officer. The approximate indicative cost of an in-theatre NCE of up to ten NZDF officers would be \$NZD 1 million.

Threat Assessment

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- 21. Security is a prime concern throughout Afghanistan. Although all Qaeda and Taleban forces were routed, pockets of resistance remain in many parts of the country. There is evidence that both groups have now combined with other anti-coalition elements in an effort to destabilise the transitional government and regain power.
- 22. The threat level in Kabul is reduced slightly by the military presence of ISAF. It remains, however, a high profile target, and opportunistic attacks are expected to continue. The threat level for NZDF personnel in Kabul is MEDIUM.
- 23. Outside of Kabul anti-government elements continue a sustained querrilla campaign. There is also lawlessness and civil unrest in many areas.

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The threat level for NZDF personnel operating outside of Kabul is HIGH.

Recommendations

- 24. It is recommended that Ministers with Power to Act:
- a. <u>note</u> the options for possible NZDF contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
- b. note that the options listed in this submission do not preclude an NZDF contribution to future post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq.

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<u>provide</u> direction on those options for which more detailed proposals and assessments of their financial implications should be prepared for Cabinet, giving a planning priority.

e. <u>note</u> that further consideration of the options listed above is dependent on consultation with the relevant parties, and the deployment of an NZDF reconnaissance team to Afghanistan, and possibly the United States, would be required for this purpose.

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B.R. Ferguson (A)

Air Marshal

Chief of Defence Force

Simon Murdoch Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Rt Hon Helen Clark Prime Minister Hon Dr Michael Cullen Deputy Prime Minister

Hon Jim Anderton

Hon Phil Goff Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Hon Mark Burton Minister of Defence

Locations by Province/Unland Regions

